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Abstract: All legal systems have their own solution for the treatment of the essential 
change of circumstance subsequent to the conclusion of the contract. Some of them allow for 
the judicial amendment of the contract, if the conditions of the clausula rebus sic stantibus 
are fulfilled.  There are other states, where the possibility to modify the contract by judicial 
act in case of an essential change of circumstances subsequent to the contract conclusion has 
only recently been recognised by the national legislation. In the following, it is to be reviewed 
how and by what means and models English law treats those changes of circumstances which 
occur after the conclusion of the contract and significantly reshape the contractual 
relationships.  
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Absztrakt: A szerződéskötést követően a körülményekben bekövetkező lényeges változások 
figyelembe vételére és kezelésére valamennyi jogrendszeren belül kialakultak álláspontok. A 
különböző jogintézmények, alkalmazott megoldások bár sok szempontból hasonlatosak, 
azonban számos eltérés is megfigyelhető. A tanulmány átfogóan mutatja be, hogy az angol jog 
miként kezeli a körülménybeli változásokat és azok szerződésekre kifejtett hatását. Ennek 
során bemutatásra kerül a szerződés meghiúsulásának tana (frustration of contract) és az 
elmélet kialakulásának alapjául szolgáló, bírósági esetjog. 
Tárgyszavak: körülmények utólagos megváltozása, clausula rebus sic stantibus, hardship, 
szerződés meghiúsulása, frustration, Brexit, koronavírus 
 
 
The judgment and treatment of the changes in circumstances belongs to the field of 
contract law. Though the obligation law rules, including contract law provisions, provide the 
dynamics of civil law, the various legal transactions and contracts to be concluded basically 
reflect a given time, since the rights and duties of the contractual parties are fixed with regard 
to those circumstances which exist at the time of the contract’s conclusion. However, changes 
can occur in the circumstances of the contract, which can impact on the durable contractual 
relationship existing between the parties, including their rights and duties, and particularly on 
the duty to fulfil the contract. 
All legal systems have their own solution for the treatment of the essential change of 
circumstance subsequent to the conclusion of the contract. Some of them allow for the judicial 
amendment of the contract, if the conditions of the clausula rebus sic stantibus are fulfilled.1 
There are other states, where the possibility to modify the contract by judicial act in case of an 
essential change of circumstances subsequent to the contract conclusion has only recently 
been recognised by the national legislation. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that these 
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relatively new regulations bind the application of the contract amendment by judicial act to 
strict limits.2 
It is typical that the essential change of circumstances and its effects on the contractual 
relationship attracted more and more attention from the legislation and the jurisprudence, 
when historic events having a global impact occurred. It was after the World War I when the 
modern jurisprudence examined3 the problem thoroughly.4 Afterwards, the Great Depression 
in 1929 and its effects and consequences made it clear that the changes occurred in the 
contractual relationship because of the essential change of circumstances, i.e. the effect of 
such changes on the position of the contractual parties does require particular attention. 
However, another segment of national legislators failed to take any actions in spite of the 
recognition mentioned above and, based on various dogmatic considerations, considers the 
binding force of contract as priority and keeps the obligation to fulfil the contract in mind. In 
other countries, for instance in Hungary, clausula rebus sic stantibus is declared as an 
exemption from the principle pacta sunt servanda.  
The demand for the application of the clausula and for the regulation of the contract 
amendment by judicial act arose again after the global economic crisis in 2008. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this newer recession is not comparable to the economic crisis in 
1929, the detrimental changes which occurred in the contractual relationships due to the crisis 
and which often broke the contractual balance, increasingly raised the need to create a 
solution via legislative means.   
However, the answers of the different countries to the changes in circumstances after the 
conclusion of the contract vary widely and one difference is whether the solution to be applied 
is based on statute law or it was developed by the case-law of the courts. 
Hondius and Grigoleit examined the effect of the change of circumstances on the 
contractual relationship in the European countries and they distinguished, with respect to the 
legislative and judicial recognition of this effect, between open and closed legal systems.5 In 
countries classified as open legal systems (e.g. Germany, Austria, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) unforeseen changes of circumstances are defined 
both in the relating legal regulation and in the judicial practice as a general exemption, upon 
which the contractual parties are allowed to adopt their contract to the changed circumstances. 
On the contrary, in the closed legal systems (e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
England, France, Ireland, Scotland and Slovenia) there is no similar solution. There are 
several arguments to explain this. On the one hand, there are countries, where the clausula is 
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not declared by the civil law rules. On the other hands, there are other countries where the 
clausula is known in the judicial practice, but the possibility to adapt the contract to the 
changed circumstances has not been generally recognised. 
Nevertheless, albeit its illustrative nature, the distinction between open and closed legal 
systems is purely theoretical and therefore it is less suitable for showing in a certain case the 
differences existing between the solutions applied by the various countries.6  
As mentioned before, during the development of the private law, several legal institutions 
have been evolved in the laws of the various states for the treatment of the effects of the 
changes of circumstances on the contractual relationship.7 Such an example is the theory of 
imprevision (“théorie de l’imprévision”) in the French civil law, while the treatment of the 
changes in circumstances are regulated from the obligation law reform of 2002 within the 
rules on the collapse of the underlying basis of the transaction (“Störung des 
Geschäftsgrundlage”) by the German civil code.8  
In Italian civil law, there are also some provisions which deal with the effects of the 
change of circumstances on the contractual relationship.9 The adoption of these rules was 
partly due to the events which occurred in the first part of the 20th century. Moreover, Italian 
civil law at that time was strongly influenced by German private law jurisprudence, such as 
Windscheid’s doctrine of tacit presupposition (“Lehre von der Voraussetzung”) and the 
theories of Oertmann and Larenz as well.10 
IIn English law, the essential change of circumstances subsequent to the contract 
conclusion raises the applicability of several legal institutions, e.g. hardship, frustration of 
contract, impossibility and impracticability. In this context, it is to be noted that the 
aforementioned legal institutes appear differently in English and American law. Though the 
solutions applied by American law are based on English law traditions, due to the diverse 
development of the law, there are now significant differences between the legal institutions to 
be applied and their conditions and legal effects.11 
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It is important to note that the legal institutions appeared in the various national civil 
laws have several similarities and they correspond more or less to each other. Nevertheless, 
they are not absolutely identical.  
On the one hand, it can be explained by the systemic differences of the various states, i.e. 
if a given state belongs to the Anglo-Saxon or a continental legal system. On the other hand, 
the divergent developmental tendencies of the continental legal system (Germanic or French 
tradition) and the dogmatic differences also explains the greater or lesser diversions of the 
various legal institutions.12 
In the following, it is to be reviewed how and by what means and models   English law 
treats those changes of circumstances which occur after the conclusion of the contract and 
significantly reshape the contractual relationships. 
 
 
1. The theory of frustration of contract  
 
The demand for treating the effects of the changes of circumstances on the contractual 
relationship and for treating the situation that evolved due to these changes arose in 
continental law relatively early. Similarly, this demand also appeared in English law, since the 
various national legislators intended to react to the same problems, e.g. the negative impact of 
the world wars.13 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the above- mentioned demand arose 
much earlier in English law, during the 1700s, than in continental law. In the judicial practice, 
the impacts of the effects of the changes of circumstances can be treated according to the 
theory known as frustration of contract. 
At first sight, this theory is very similar to other legal institutions which appear in 
continental laws. Nonetheless, there are several differences regarding the content of these 
legal institutions. According to Rösler, the similarity between the theory of frustration of 
contract and the various solutions which appear in continental laws is evident.14 Zimmermann 
goes further, and states that the doctrine of frustration of contract and the legal solution 
declared in Article 313 of the BGB (“collapse of the underlying basis of the transaction”) are 
not only similar, but functionally equivalent with regard to their aim.15  
The binding force of contract and its sanctity had practically not been controversial in 
English law until the middle of the 19th century. According to the doctrine of absolute 
contracts, contractual duties were regarded as absolute, in the sense that supervening events 
provided no excuse for non-performance,16 regardless of the nature of the change. It meant 
that the contractual parties had to fulfil the contract even if changes occurred in the 
circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of the contract.  
It is quite visible that the English law approach to the changes of circumstances was 
similar to continental law, which were based on the Roman law principle, pacta sunt 
servanda. However, while  German, French and Italian law knew an exceptional clause 
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(clausula rebus sic stantibus) from the principle declaring the binding force of contracts, even 
if it was not recognised by legislation, the above-mentioned clause rooted in the Middle Ages 
was entirely unknown in  English law.17 Instead of this, the doctrine of frustration of contract 
dedicated to treat the effects of the changes of circumstances on the contractual relationship 
had been developed alongside various precedents and had been accepted as we know it now. 
In the course of this development process, various cases and events were outlined, which 
cause the essential change of circumstances and thereby lead to the frustration of contract and 
absolve the contractual parties from the duty to fulfil the contract. (Such event can be the 
failure of an anticipated event, the outbreak of a war, the subsequent illegality and so on.) 
In its extensive work, Peel examines the doctrine of frustration of contract thoroughly and 
determines several types and subtypes of frustrating events, such as impossibility, frustration 
of purpose or illegality. Supervening impossibility can arise in various ways, e.g. as a result of 
the whole or partial destruction of a particular thing or of the death or incapacity of either 
party in the case of certain “personal” contracts. Impossibility can also arise, when the 
subject-matter of contract, or a thing or person essential for the purpose of its performance 
does not cease, but becomes unavailable for that purpose.18 
Although the above-mentioned classification contains several types of frustrating events, it 
is important to state that there is no numerus clausus, i.e. there is no limited class of 
frustrating events. Over time, the number of these events has constantly been changing, 
sometimes faster, sometimes slower. At the beginning of the development of the theory, there 
was an extension, i.e. the number of judgments, in which the frustration of contract by a 
certain event was recognised, increased. Later, the initial frames started to narrow and there 
were cases where frustration was successfully pleaded, but later, these were overruled.19 
Nowadays, the evolution and alteration of the doctrine is still ongoing, though its pace is 
much slower. Nevertheless, the question of frustration comes back time and again, which 
requires the courts to deal with and judge these cases.  
In the following, I review the beginning of the development process of the above-
mentioned doctrine by the presentation of the relating precedents. 
 
 
1.1. The case of Paradine v Jane 
 
The approach, which emphasised the binding force of contract was based on a precedent 
which originated in the 17th century. 
As evidenced by the facts of the case Paradine v Jane,20 a building rental contract was 
concluded between the contractual parties. However, the land was invaded by the enemy of 
the King and Jane was forced to leave the building. Since Jane could not use the building and 
could not take benefits, he refused to pay the fee to Paradine, who brought an action against 
Jane and claimed the court to oblige Jane to pay the rent arrears. 
As it was stated by the court, where a party brings a duty or charge upon himself by virtue 
of a contract, he is bound to perform the duty or pay the charge, notwithstanding any event, 
for which the party could have inserted a clause in the contract, which would prescribe what is 
to be done in case of an event. The party’s duty to fulfil the contract, as well as his liability in 
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case of the infringement of this duty, is absolute in nature.21 Therefore, the court held that 
Jane was bound to pay the fee to Paradine, despite the fact that the land was temporarily 
invaded by the enemy, i.e. Jane was not released from his obligation. 
Though the court did not expressly deal with the question of impossibility, William Page 
emphasises that the case Paradine v Jane22 shall undoubtedly be deemed as a milestone in the 
developmental process of the English law approach to the impossibility of the contract.23   
 
 
1.2. Taylor v Caldwell 
 
The strict and rigid approach of the courts to the binding force of the contract seemed to  
soften during the 19th century. The first stage of this process was the case of Taylor v 
Caldwell in 1863,24 in which the doctrine of frustration of contract was firstly enunciated. (It 
is noteworthy that some authors mentioned it as the doctrine of impossibility of 
performance.25 
According to the facts described, the plaintiff, Taylor, hired out the Surrey Gardens and 
Music Hall from the defendant, Caldwell, to use it for the series of “grand concerts” enriched 
by visuals. Taylor took all the risks of organising the concerts, of signing of the artists and so 
on. Just prior to the scheduled date for the first concert, the music hall was destroyed by an 
accidental fire and the concerts planned and already organised by Taylor could not been held.  
Taylor brought an action against Caldwell by reference to breach of contract. Taylor 
considered that Caldwell could not fulfil his contractual duty because of the destruction of the 
building and therefore he claimed compensation for damages incurred due to the breach of 
contract. 
As Justice Blackburn formulated that “(…) in contracts in which the performance 
depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the 
impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the 
performance.” Accordingly, the burning to the ground of the music hall lead to the 
impossibility of the contract, which excused the contracting parties from performing the 
contract.26 
The case Taylor v Caldwell is precedential for the practice of the fulfilment of 
contractual duties and of the excuse from them, since it derives from the previous, more than 
two-hundred-old practice. With the application of the fiction of an implied condition, Justice 
Blackburn created an exemption from the binding force of contract declared in Paradine v 
Jane, without derogating from the previous judicial practice.27 Nevertheless, it is another 
question that the exemption had been more broadly interpreted in the judgments after Taylor v 
                                                 
21 Cf. Beale, Hugh: Adaptation to Changed Circumstances, Specific Performance and Remedies. Report on 
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22 In English law, Paradine v Jane was often misunderstood. The negative effects of this misinterpretation on 
English legal dogma was highlighted by Wade, William: The Principle of Impossibility in Contract. Law 
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Frustrated Contracts and Legal Fictions. The Modern Law Review, 1983/1, 39–55. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2230.1983.tb02506.x). 
27 McElroy, R. G.–Williams, Glanville: The Coronation Cases I. Modern Law Journal, 1941/4, 242. (doi: 
10.1111/j.1468-2230.1940.tb00777.x). 
  
Caldwell than it was originally intended.28 Thus, the scope of the exemption was considerably 
limited by the judgment in the case Taylor v Caldwell, since the impossibility of contract 
could have been based only on certain changes of circumstances, like the death or incapacity 
of the obligor, the occurrence of changes in circumstances, and the destruction either of the 
subject matter of contract or other thing, which is essential regarding the fulfilment of the 
contract.29   
 
 
1.3. Coronation cases 
 
The exemption formulated in Taylor v Caldwell was the base of the judgment held in 
Krell v Henry in 1902,30 which is arguably the best-known among the so-called coronation 
cases relating to the procession of King Edward VII that was cancelled due to his ill health. 
As evidenced by the facts of the case, Henry hired rooms at Paul Krell’s flat in Pall Mall, 
in London, to view from its windows the coronation procession of King Edward VII, which 
would pass along Pall Mall. After the conclusion of the contract, the King became seriously ill 
and therefore the ceremony was cancelled just two days before the coronation.31 (The 
coronation was held much later, more than one year after the originally scheduled date.) 
Henry paid a £25 deposit, but did not pay the fee for the room, because he could not use 
the flat. Krell brought an action against Henry and claimed the outstanding £50. The court 
decided in favour of Henry and relieved him from paying the rest of money. As it was stated, 
the inspecting of the coronation procession was the foundation of the contract, though the 
contract contained no reference to the coronation. At this point, it is worth invoking the stand 
of Justice Blackburn formulated in Taylor v Caldwell, in which he stated that the object of the 
contract should permanently exist. 
Regarding the facts evidenced in Krell v Henry, it can be stated that the subject matter of 
contract did not change, inasmuch as the rooms to be hired by Henry still existed and they 
were in unchanged state, i.e. they were identical. In a legal sense, the impossibility of the 
fulfilment of the contract did not occur. Nevertheless, the subject matter of the contract, or 
more precisely, the essential character of the subject matter of contract changed due to the 
change of circumstances. As Lord Atkin explained, “[t]he subject matter of the contract was 
‘rooms to view the procession’, but the postponement mad the rooms not rooms to view the 
procession.”32 As Wade concluded in his referred work, “(…) all points which are within the 
contract as agreed by the parties are part of the subject-matter of the contract, and all points 
which are  outside of it go at most to motive and are irrelevant.”33 
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30 Krell v Henry [1902] 2 KB 740. 
31 Due to the postponement of the coronation numerous actions were brought before the courts. These are the so- 
called coronations cases, which are landmark cases regarding the evolvement and development of the theory of 
frustration of performance. These cases are reviewed and analysed by McElroy and Williams in their two-part 
study, in which they pay particular attention to Krell v Henry, Herne Bay Steamboat v Hutton (1903] 2 KB 683), 
and Chandler v Webster ([1904] 1 KB 493). See McElroy–Williams: op. cit.; McElroy, R. G.–Williams, 
Glanville: The Coronation Cases II. Modern Law Journal, 1941/5, 1–20. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2230.1941.tb00877.x). 
32 Wade, William: Consensus Mistake and Impossibility in Contract. The Cambridge Law Journal, 1941/3, 361–
378. (hereinafter referred to as Wade [2]), 366. (doi: 10.1017/s0008197300126091). 
33 Ibid. 
  
Briefly, in Krell v Henry the contract did not become impossible, but the purpose of the 
contract was frustrated, for which the contract was concluded. In this sense, the doctrine of 
frustration of contract was more broadly interpreted.34  
It is also important that frustration covers both the frustration of performance of contract 
and the frustration of purpose (of contract) in English law. Conversely, the examined 
expression means only the frustration of purpose in the American law, i.e. it has a narrower 
interpretation,35 at which the commercial impossibility and impracticability appear as 
independent category. 36 
 
 
1.4. Chandler v Webster 
 
As it was previously mentioned, due to the postponement of the coronation numerous 
actions were brought before the courts, among which Krell v Henry is undoubtedly the best-
known. However, another case, Chandler v. Webster37 is also worth reviewing, despite the 
fact that later it was overruled.38 Thus, it was a landmark case for almost forty years in those 
cases, where payments or expenditures made prior to the occurrence of the contract-
frustrating event had to be treated.39  
According to the facts described, Chandler rented a room from Webster for the first day 
of the coronation procession with the intention of erecting a stand and selling tickets. The 
money was all due prior to the postponement of the coronation. Chandler paid almost the 
whole sum of money and after the postponement he sued for return of his money paid. 
Webster counterclaimed for the remainder. Chandler’s claim was rejected and Webster could 
keep the prepaid sum and was entitled to the remainder of the sum that had been agreed. The 
Court of Appeal held that money paid under a contract prior to it being frustrated could be 
recovered upon a “total failure of consideration”. But, in order to constitute such a situation, 
the contract had to be set aside from the beginning. As McKendrick points it out, 
“[f]rustration does not have such a consequence. The contract is set aside from the moment 
                                                 
34 The Krell v Henry was elaborated by Zoltán Csehi in his work relating to impossibility. See Csehi, Zoltán: ‘A 
király megbetegedett:’ a szerződés lehetetlenül. Az idő dimenziója a lehetetlenülés körében – az időszakos 
lehetetlenülés problémája. In: Emlékkönyv Lontai Endre egyetemi tanár tiszteletére, ELTE-ÁJK–Gondolat, 
Budapest, 2005, 37–52. 
35 Momberg: op. cit., 139; Corbin, Arthur L.: Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts. Harward Law 
Review, 1937/1, 464–466. (doi: 10.2307/1333316); Anderson, Arthur: Frustration of Contract – A Rejected 
Doctrine. DePaul Law Review, 1953/1, 1–22; Hubbard, Steven W.: Relief from Burdensome Longterm 
Contracts: Commercial Impracticability, Frustration of Purpose, Mutual Mistake of Fact, and Equitable 
Adjustment. Missouri Law Review, 1982/1, 83–84; Eisenberg: op. cit., 210, 233. 
36 In this context see Walter, Paula: Commercial Impracticability in Contracts. St. John’s Law Review, 1987/2, 
225–260; Posner, Richard A.–Rosenfield, Andrew M.: Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis. The Journal of Legal Studies, 1977/1, 83–118. (doi: 10.1086/467564); Dellinger, Myanna: 
An “Act of God” – Rethinking Contractual Impracticability in an Era of Anthropogenic Climate Change. 
Hastings Law Journal, 2016/6, 1551–1620. 
37 Chandler v Webster [1904] 1 KB 493. 
38 The Chandler v Webster ([1904] 1 KB 493) was overruled in the Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson 
Combe Barbour Ltd HL ([1943] AC 32). About this latter judgment see Williams, Glanville L.: The End of 
Chandler v Webster. The Modern Law Review, 1942/1–2, 46–57. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.1942.tb02865.x). 
39 In its relating study, Goldberg examines and reviews the Chandler v Webster from a special point of view, 
when he compares the English and American rules and criticises the approach, according to which the 
application of Chandler v Webster is totally refused.  See Goldberg, Victor Paul: After Frustration: Three Cheers 
for Chandler v. Webster. Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper, No. 382, 1133–1169. (doi: 
10.2139/ssrn.1703123). 
  
of the occurrence of the frustrating event but the termination is not retrospective in its 
effect.”40  
 
 
1.5. Legal consequences 
 
In English law, frustration of contract automatically resulted in the discharge of both 
contractual parties from the obligation.41 However, on the performance of the ongoing duties, 
or other duties having a repetitive nature, contractual parties usually carried out further 
negotiations, which resulted in the conclusion of a new contract, which contained new terms 
and conditions, but did not affect the original contract. In the meanwhile, duties which 
became due before the occurrence of the frustrating event remained unchanged, in the lack of 
any relating legal provision.42 Moreover, it was also not regulated as to which contractual 
party takes the responsibility for the damages and loss caused by the change in circumstances.    
According to English law, all of the original duties under the contract, including principal 
and other secondary duties, ceased due to the frustration. The same applied to other duties like 
obligations relating to the breach of contract or compensation. Accordingly, the general rule 
was that the party took the liability for damages caused by the frustrating event, who suffered 
the damage.43 However, it was also important, if the contractual consideration was paid in 
advance or upon the completion of the given work.44 
The above-mentioned solution applied in English law sometimes placed the contractual 
parties in an unfair situation. As a striking example, reference can be made to Chandler v 
Webster, in which the court held that that an obligation to pay, which was due before the time 
of frustration, was not affected by the frustrating event, therefore residuary payments had to 
be made  and payments previously made could not be recovered. Although it is true that 
Chandler v Webster was later overruled in the Fibrosa case, according to which the paid and 
unpaid considerations could be arranged, this solution treated only the evolved unfair 
situations, but did not pay attention to the prevention of the contractual party’s unjust 
enrichment due to the frustrating event.45  
Therefore, partly due to the strong criticism voiced in Fibrosa,46 Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act (hereinafter referred as to LRA)47 was adopted by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom in 1943. LRA aimed to provide greater protection to a party who pays a sum of 
money on the basis of a contractual agreement in circumstances where the contract has been 
frustrated. Specifically, this would be to remedy the unfortunate situations that had been 
previously seen in cases such as the above-mentioned Chandler v Webster. For this purpose, 
LRA contains detailed provisions on the rights and obligations relating to the contracts 
                                                 
40 McKendrick, Ewan: Contract Law. Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 730. 
(doi: 10.1093/he/9780199699384.001.0001). 
41 It was confirmed by the judgment in Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd., in which it was stated that 
frustration leads to the termination of contract, whether parties intend this effect or not. Cf. Hirji Mulji v Cheong 
Yue Steamship Co Ltd [1926] AC 497. In the judgment in Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd, the 
court adopted a similar position. Cf. Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd [1935] AC 524.  
42 Cf. Rösler: op. cit., 499; Beale: op. cit., 11; Schmiedlin, Stefan: Frustration of contract und clausula rebus sic 
stantibus. Eine rechtvergleichende Analyse. Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel und Frankfurt am Main, 1985, 65–66. 
43 Cf. Fibrosa SA v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32. 
44 Cf. Appleby v Myers [1867] LR 2 CP 65 1. 
45 Cf. Meier, Sonja: Unjust factors and legal grounds. In: Johnston, David–Zimmermann, Reinhard (eds.): 
Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, 
66. (doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511495519.003). 
46 Stewart, Andrew–Carter, J. W.: Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: The Case for a Reappraisal. 
The Cambridge Law Journal, 1992/1, 76. (doi: 10.1017/s0008197300016779). 
47 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943. 
  
affected by a frustrating event.48 With the adoption of the LRA, the Parliament primarily 
intended to prevent the contractual party’s unjust enrichment due to the frustration of 
fulfilment or frustration of purpose of the contract.49 For this reason, LRA declares that “[a]ll 
sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the contract before the time when the 
parties were so discharged (‘the time of discharge’) shall, in the case of sums so paid, be 
recoverable from him (…).” However, this provision is applicable only in those cases where, 
due to the frustrating event, both parties are discharged from the performance of their 
contractual duties. In all those cases, where only either of the parties is discharged, legal 
consequences will be applied according to the principles previously evolved in the judicial 
practice. 
It should also be noted that that the application of the LRA is excluded in certain cases, 
e.g. it shall not apply to certain types of contracts determined by law. With some exceptions, 
such contracts include the carriage of goods by sea, any contract of insurance and any other 
contract for the sale, or for the sale and delivery, of specific goods, where the contract is 
frustrated by reason of the fact that the goods have perished.50 
 
 
2. The theory of frustration in the recent judicial practice 
 
The above-mentioned precedents are definitely landmark cases in the course of the 
development of the doctrine of frustration of contract. However, treating the impacts of the 
changes of circumstances arises time and again. New situations arise and new judgments were 
born, by which the original doctrine has further been refined and shaded, even the LRA 
contains provisions. 
The doctrine of frustration of contract received a different, but also exact description in 
the case of Davis Contractors v Fareham Urban UDC.51  
According to the facts described, Davis Contractors agreed with Fareham Urban District 
Council to erect 78 houses within a period of eight months, at a price of £92,425. The work 
started in June 1946, but due to various reasons (e.g. serious shortage of skilled labour and 
materials in the industry), it took not eight but 22 months and was completed only in May 
1948. Moreover, the completion of the work was much more expensive than anticipated. 
Davis Contractors were paid the contractually agreed price but brought an action arguing for 
more money based on the fact that the contract had been frustrated and therefore they were 
entitled to further payment based on a quantum meruit basis.   
The court recognised that the obligor’s duty to perform the contract became more 
difficult to perform due to the change of circumstances, i.e. the lack of skilled labour and 
materials. However, it formulated that the contract was not frustrated. At this point the 
opinion of Lord Radcliffe shall be highlighted, in which he attempted to define the frustration 
of contract in the following way: “(…) frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that, 
without the default of either party, a contractual obligation has become incapable of being 
performed because the circumstance in which performance is called for would render it a 
                                                 
48 About the provisions of the LRA see Williams, Glanville, L.: The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 
1943. Modern Law Review, 1944/1–2, 66–69; Stewart–Carter: op. cit., 79–82; Schmiedlin: op. cit., 69–86. 
49 Before the adoption of LRA, unjust enrichment arisen due to the frustrating event, was severally discussed in 
the contemporary literature. See Buckland, William Warwick: Casus and Frustration in Roman and Common 
Law. Harvard Law Review, 1933/8, 1281–1300. (doi: 10.2307/1331622); Gutteridge, Harold. C.–Lipstein, Kurt: 
Conflicts of Law in Matters of Unjustifiable Enrichment. The Cambridge Law Journal, 1939/1, 80–93. (doi: 
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50 Cf. LRA, Article 2, paragraph (5), point a)-c). 
51 Davis Contractors Limited v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696. 
  
thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract.”52 This approach 
was later confirmed by other judgments, for instance in Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl 
GmbH53 and in National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd.54 In the latter case it was 
held that the doctrine of frustration is also applicable to leases in exceptional circumstances, 
although a lease is more than a simple contract.  
Regarding all the above-mentioned facts, that there are cases when the literal compliance 
of contract conditions (e.g. contractual price) would be unfair for both parties in light of the 
new (changed) circumstances, in such a situation the law relieves both contractual parties 
from the duty to perform the contract.55  
Relating to the doctrine of frustration of contract, J. Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (The 
Super Servant Two)56 is also a landmark case. 
According to the facts described, the defendant Wijsmuller agreed to transport the 
plaintiff’s large and heavy drilling rig, named Dan King, from Japan to the Rotterdam area of 
the North Sea, using a transportation unit, described as Super Servant One or Super Servant 
Two.  These were large, self-propelled, semi-submersible barges built for carrying large loads 
such as this rig. Under the contract, the defendant could replace the transportation unit by 
other means of transport or cancel the contract on grounds determined in the contract. Such 
events were the force majeure, acts of God, perils or danger and accidents of the sea, acts of 
war or warlike-operations, acts of public enemies, blockade, strikes, etc., which reasonably 
may impede, prevent or delay the performance of this contract. 
In January, 1981, several months before Dan King was due to be tendered for carriage, 
Super Servant Two foundered and became a total loss in the course of off-loading another 
drilling rig in the Zaire River. Wijsmuller informed Lauritzen, that they would not carry out 
the transportation of the rig with either Super Servant One or Super Servant Two. Wijsmuller 
alleged that Super Servant Two would have been used for the Dan King carriage contract. It 
was added, that the other vessel, Super Servant One, had been scheduled to carry, and did 
carry, cargo under two other contracts spanning the expected period of performance under the 
Dan King contract.  
Wijsmuller and Lauritzen entered into new negotiations, which led to a further 
agreement in April 1981 under which the rig was transported by Wijsmuller between July and 
October by barge and tug. This different method of carriage caused both of the parties’ loss or 
increased expense, therefore both parties claimed for the loss it has suffered. In the action, 
Lauritzen claimed damages for breach of the Dan King carriage contract, while Wijsmuller 
pleaded that the contract had been frustrated and claimed for the extra costs arose by the 
performance of the contract. 
The court of first instance ruled in favour of the plaintiff, who appealed to the Court of 
Appeal. The appeal was dismissed by Lord Justice Bingham. In his judgment he resumed the 
essential elements of the frustration of contract and defined its special conditions in the given 
case. According to the judgment, the contract was not frustrated, because Wijsmuller’s chance 
to perform the carriage contract physically still remained after the sinking of the Super 
Servant Two. In any case, Wijsmuller put its own interests above the other party’s when 
considering economic and business policy aspects, deciding to perform another existing 
contract, and, with this act, booked the other vessel, which was also specified in the carriage 
                                                 
52 Davis Contractors Limited v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696. Cf. Collins, Hugh: The Law of 
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contract and which would also be suitable for transporting Lauritzen’s rig. In the judgment it 
was stated that the frustration of contract can occur only in case of a certain external event or 
change in circumstances, i.e. frustration cannot be based on the conduct or the choice of the 
party claiming frustration. Moreover, this party cannot contribute57 to the occurrence of the 
frustrating event.58  
The frustration of contract was also examined by the court in Gamerco SA v ICM/Fair 
Warning (Agency) Ltd.59 Gamerco, a Spanish company agreed with the corporate persona of 
the American rock band Guns N’ Roses to organise a concert in the stadium Atletico Madrid. 
Beyond the concrete organising tasks, Gamerco also agreed to manage the previous 
promotion of the event. A few days before the concert, engineers reported the venue was 
structurally unsound and the competent authorities banned its further use pending further 
investigations. At the same time, Gamerco’s license to use the venue was revoked. Since there 
was no chance to use another appropriate venue, the concert finally was cancelled. Gamerco 
brought an action against the band and claimed the recovery of the sum of 412,500 dollars, 
which was previously paid by Gamerco. In its judgment the court stated that the contract was 
frustrated, because the performance of the contract became impossible due to the revocation 
of the permit by the competent authority. Therefore, the band was obliged to recover the sum 
paid. 
In Sea Angel,60 the frustration of contract also was stated by the court. As evidenced by 
the facts of the case, in the summer of 2003, the Tasman Spirit, a tanker loaded with light 
crude oil, run aground and was broken in two near the port of Karachi, Pakistan. Due to the 
accident, large quantities of crude oil spilled from the tanker, causing significant marine oil 
pollution. 
Tsavrilis, a group dedicated to saving life and property at sea and to protecting the 
marine environment from accident-related pollution, concluded a contract with the owners of 
the Tamsan Spirit to assist in the salvage operation concerning the tanker. In order to perform 
the contract, Tsavrilis concluded further contracts and hired several vessels. One of them, the 
Sea Angel had the task to act as a shuttle tanker and to carry the oil from the damaged Tasman 
Spirit to a larger tanker. The Sea Angel was hired for twenty days, but the vessel arrived at the 
location about three months after the expiry of the contract. The delay was due to the fact that 
the vessel was withheld by the authorities in the port of departure. (As it was later proved, the 
authorities’ conduct was unlawful.) Tsavrilis refused to pay the fee for the time after the 
expiry of the contract. 
The claimants took legal action to recover the hire fees. The Queen’s Bench ruled in 
favour of the claimants and stated that the contract was not frustrated. On the one hand, the 
risk of detention is well-known and typical in the salvage industry, and it is inherent in such 
contracts, therefore Tsavrilis should have taken it into account as reasonable risk, i.e. this risk 
was foreseeable. On the other hand, the risk of delay falls within the scope of contractual 
risks, which should be taken by the hirer, Tsavrilis. Tsavrilis appealed to the Court of Appeal, 
which dismissed the appeal. As Lord Justice Rix stated, “(…) the application of the doctrine 
of frustration requires a multi-factorial approach. Among the factors which have to be 
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considered are the terms of the contract itself, its matrix or context, the parties’ knowledge, 
expectations, assumptions and contemplations, in particular as to risk, as at the time of 
contract, at any rate so far as these can be ascribed mutually and objectively, and then the 
nature of the supervening event, and the parties’ reasonable and objectively ascertainable 
calculations as to the possibilities of future performance in the new circumstances.” Some of 
these factors exist at the time of the contract. These factors, i.e. the terms of the contract, its 
matrix or context, and the parties’ knowledge, expectations, assumptions and contemplations, 
in particular as to risk, can be called ex ante factors. The other factors, such as the nature of 
the supervening event and the parties’ reasonable and objectively ascertainable calculations as 
to the possibility of future performance in the new circumstances, are post-contractual. The 
“multi-factorial approach” drafted by LJ Rix, was endorsed on several occasions in recent 
years.61  
Moreover, beyond the necessity of this “multi-factorial approach” required by the 
doctrine of frustration, LJ Rix referred to the reasons held by Lord Radcliffe in Davis 
Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC and explained, why the test of “radically different” is 
important. According to LJ Rix, this test “(…) tells us that the doctrine is not to be lightly 
invoked; that mere incidence of expense or delay or onerousness is not sufficient; and that 
there has to be as it were a break in identity between the contract as provided for and 
contemplated and its performance in the new circumstances.” 62 
 
 
3. Brexit as a frustrating event?  
 
The political changes of the last few years showed several situations, where the 
assessment of a certain change as frustrating event is controversial at present. 
Among these examples, Brexit, i.e. the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union had special importance, since it has a strong impact on contracts and their 
performance. Thus, after the occurrence of Brexit exchange rate changes can occur or various 
taxes and duties can be introduced, due to which the profitability of the previously concluded 
(i.e. at the time of Brexit already existing) contracts can decrease. Moreover, the fact that the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law such as free movement of goods and services 
will no longer prevail, causes further difficulties in the case of the performance of existing 
contracts. 
In the beginning several opinions appeared relating to the performance of contract. Some 
experts said that there would be cases where the performance of the contract would become 
impossible or the maintenance of the contract no longer would be in the interest of either or 
both of the parties due to Brexit. According to Lehmann and Zetzsche, such a situation would 
arise when an English law firm provides advisory services regarding EU subsidies for an 
investment in the UK. Since these subsidies will no longer be available after Brexit the 
service promised will become aimless.63  
Nevertheless, it was a general opinion that in the majority of cases Brexit would make 
the performance of the contract more difficult but not impossible. In the course of the 
assessment of Brexit and its impact, it was also emphaiszed that not every contract would 
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equally be effected by Brexit, but its impact would depend on the type of the given contract.64 
Accordingly, taking the findings of the previous judgments65 into account, referring to Brexit 
as a frustrating event would be successful very rarely, only in those cases when Brexit would 
actually cause the essential and radical change of the duties to be performed under an existing 
contract.66 Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that in certain cases Brexit would give rise to 
the early, impossibility-based termination of a given contract.67  
It should also be noted that during the years of the Brexit negotiations between the UK 
and the EU, more and more contracts were supplemented by a hardship clause in the event of 
Brexit in the English contract law practice. The insertion of a so-called Brexit clause into the 
contract enabled the parties to provide for the functioning of their contractual relationship 
after Brexit. Within the framework of this clause, parties could determine either the automatic 
changes (e.g. termination of contract) or a procedure whereby discussions are held with a 
view to changing the contract due to Brexit. Inserting a Brexit clause meant security for the 
contractual parties. Nevertheless, in all other cases where parties did not insert such a clause, 
the impact of the Brexit on the existing contractual relationship shall be examined and 
assessed, and legal consequences will be applied by courts on a case-by-case basis. 
With regards to this matter, Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd & Ors v European Medicines 
Agency,68 shall be mentioned. 
According to the facts of the case, the European Medicines Agency (hereinafter referred 
to as to EMA), after multiannual negotiations, entered into a lease for a term of 25 years in 
2014 with the Canary Wharf Group (hereinafter referred as to CW) to secure premises for its 
headquarters in London. In August, 2017, EMA informed CW that having considered the 
position under English law they intend to treat Brexit as a frustrating event. The EMA stated 
that after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union the EMA should re-
locate away from the UK. As the EMA stated, “[i]t would be unprecedented and incongruous 
for an EU body (…) to be located in the UK and continue to pursue its mission in London 
after the UK has left the EU.”69 Although Brexit has not occurred yet, in 2018 the EU passed 
a Regulation that relocated the EMA headquarters from London to Amsterdam. CW brought a 
claim against the EMA and disputed that Brexit would be a frustrating event. The EMA 
argued that the contract was frustrating on the grounds of supervening illegality, since it 
would not be legally possible for it to continue with its headquarters in London as it did not 
have legal capacity to hold or deal with immovable property outside the EU. On the other 
hand, EMA also it also relied upon the frustration of a common purpose. 
The court decided in favour of CW and found that the lease would not be frustrated by 
Brexit, either because of supervening illegality or frustration of a common purpose. As it was 
stated, English contract law did not take into account supervening illegality arising under a 
foreign law (e.g. EU law) when determining whether a contract had been frustrated. 
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Therefore, though EU law may be relevant to the capacity of EMA to enter into the lease, it 
was not relevant to the question of whether subsequent illegality had caused the lease to be 
frustrated.  
It is important to note that prior to this judgment, it was suggested that a “no-deal Brexit” 
may constitute the kind of unexpected and serious event that would be classified as a 
frustrating event. Nevertheless, in spite of the clear reasons of the judgment, far-reaching 
conclusions must not be drawn, since the case is to be continued before the Court of Appeal, 
as the EMA appealed against the judgement. Anyway, final judgment of the Court of Appeal 
could be a landmark case in the future regarding the assessment of Brexit. At the same time, it 
shall be seen that the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union shall be 
examined by the court case-by-case, taking all special circumstances, conditions and features 
of the given case into consideration.  
 The assessment of Brexit and deeming it as an exceptional event was an important 
question not only for English law, but all Member States of the EU; both representatives of 
the literature and legal practice were concerned about the question. Relying on Brexit being a 
frustrating event can marginally be successful in English law. Nonetheless, there can be 
another approach outside the UK, in the case of cross-border contractual relationships not 
governed by English law, since the change of circumstances and the supervening of special 
events are regulated by law in several state in the European continent.   
In connection with the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, Cordeiro concluded that 
Brexit can be considered as an essential change of circumstances, which can be the basis for 
the amendment or termination of contract, according to the provisions of the given national 
(German, French, Italian, etc.) laws. 
At the same time, a contrary view seems to have emerged in Germany. The 
representatives of this approach compare Brexit to German reunification in 1990 and, by 
invoking the contemporary German judicial practice, does not consider Brexit as an event 
which would base, in general, the amendment and adaptation of contract on the changed 
circumstances. Instead of this, it is held that the impacts of Brexit should be assessed in the 
relationships between British and German business partners case-by-case and in full 
knowledge of the facts and circumstances.70  
As can be seen, Brexit can be assessed by the various national laws in different ways. 
However, the examination of this question goes beyond the applicability of the civil law 
provisions of the various states. Indeed, the question of the applicable law has to be answered 
at first. Thus, contractual parties have the right to choose the law to be applied for the given 
contract. 
Although the actual date of Brexit and its conditions has been unforeseeable for a long 
time, on 31 January, 2020, the United Kingdom left the European Union. Nevertheless, it is 
not the end of the story, and the impacts of Brexit are still worthwhile examining further. 
Though Brexit is formally completed, there are several open questions which have an impact 
on the existing contractual relationships. Ongoing negotiations between the UK and the EU, 
for instance, on the forms and possibilities for the future trade cooperation, lead to new 
problems which shall be assessed over time. 
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4. Coronavirus: force majeure or a new ground for frustration? 
 
In the world of international contractual relations, there are certain events which are treated 
relatively uniformly in the legal practice. For instance, it is beyond any dispute that wars and 
natural disasters like earthquakes or tsunamis are such events which make the performance of 
an existing contract not only more difficult, but excuses the contractual party’s liability if he 
cannot perform the contract due to these events. Such events were recently the detrimental 
earthquake and the subsequent tsunami in eastern Japan in 2011, or the war situation caused 
by the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula by the Russian Federation in 2014.71  
However, the most recent factor which can have impact on the performance of 
international contracts is the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). The measures 
introduced by the Chinese authorities in order to stop the epidemic (e.g. closure of factories 
and logistic centres, closing of seaports and airports for an indefinite time) sooner or later will 
make the performance of contractual obligations impossible for more and more producers and 
suppliers. In Europe, mass diseases are registrated in Italy, where even larger areas are going 
under quarantine. More and more organisations announce the cancellation of different events, 
where masses of people can contract and can potentially pass on the infection, while the 
closure of borders and the suspension of certain flight destinations also have negative impact 
on the economy.  
At present, it is questionable if the epidemic shall be deemed as a force majeure event 
upon which the performance of the contract can be suspended or the contract can be 
terminated, or if it only makes the performance of the contract more difficult, i.e. it shall be 
deemed as a frustrating event. The assessment of coronavirus is especially important in the 
case of travel contracts, where the time of the conclusion of contract shall be the first feature 
to be examined regarding the foreseeability of the event, i.e. the outbreak and the 
globalisation of the epidemic.  
By the spread of the epidemic, the number of those who give their opinion is increasing, 
but there is no univocal answer at present. Although the economic considerations are 
secondary to the protection of human health, it is obvious that not only the medical aspect of 
coronavirus shall be treated, but legal solutions shall be defined, upon which the economic 
and legal risks caused by the epidemic can be treated. However, it should be mentioned that in 
international contractual relationships the assessment of coronavirus as frustrating or force 
majeure event will also depend on the law applicable to the parties’ contract. It should also be 
added that the assessment of other epidemics, like the outbreak of the Ebola epidemic in 2014 
also can help in providing an answer.72 At present, it is unpredictable if coronavirus will 
spread around the world and the epidemic transform into a pandemic. Nevertheless, it is 
clearly visible that the epidemic has serious impacts on the economy in the different 
continents, which spill over increasingly. These negative consequences can only be measured 
by the effects of the economic crisis in 2008, therefore national legislators and actors of the 
legal practice shall prepare for the treatement of the change of circumstances due to the 
epidemic and shall take a stand on this issue. 
 
 
5. Closing remarks 
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After the brief review of the relating precedents, it can be stated that English law 
recognises the effect of the change of circumstance, that is, a supervening event, on the 
contractual relationship. The frames of the evaluation of such changes are designated by both 
the LRA and the judicial case law. Nevertheless, it also shall be stated that in English law, 
contrary to continental national laws, change of circumstance does not give rise to the 
amendment of the contract. Instead of this, there is two ways for the evaluation of the impacts 
of the changes in circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of the contract.73 The legal 
status of the contract existing between the parties depends on the measure and the intensity of 
the changes in circumstances. 
If the change in circumstances results in the essential change of the contract, due to which 
the contractual duty cannot be performed, the contract is frustrated and both parties are 
discharged from the performance of the contract. If the change in circumstances was less 
significant, contractual parties remain bound by their agreement, i.e. the binding force of 
contract (“sanctity of contract”) prevails in their relationship and the contractual duties shall 
be performed. Otherwise, parties can diverge from this rule if their contract contained a 
hardship clause for the case of an occurrence of a change in circumstance after the conclusion 
of the contract. Briefly, a frustrating event is one which occurs after the conclusion of the 
contract and which is so fundamental as to go to the root of the contract, which is neither 
party’s fault and renders further performance impossible, illegal or makes it radically 
different from that which was contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was made. 
Summarising the previously cases, it shall be noted that the doctrine of frustration of 
contract is the only legally clearly justified approach in English law which takes the impacts 
of the change in circumstances into account.74 According to the theory, a contractual party is 
relieved from the duty to perform the contract if, due to the change in circumstances, the 
performance of the contract became impossible, or the purpose of the contract has been 
frustrated. In this latter case, the parties’ interest in the performance of the contract also ceases 
due to the frustration of purpose. 
Nevertheless, as was previously mentioned, the scope of the frustrating events is not 
closed; various cases and frustrating events are drafted by the judicial practice.  
As Beale noted in its previously referred work, the theory of frustration of contract, in 
accordance with the strict approach of the English courts towards the “sanctity of contracts”, 
the effects of change in circumstances on the contractual relations are recognised within strict 
limitations. Therefore, frustration of contract can be caused by either of the cases of 
impossibility, but cannot be per se based on the fact that the performance of the contract 
became commercially impracticable due to the change of circumstances. Under English law, 
the establishing of the termination of contract upon frustration is the ultimate solution applied 
by the courts, while other principles, like the parties’ freedom to contract and the sanctity of 
contract, i.e. the observance of the terms agreed by the parties, still take precedence at the 
present time. 75 
Nonetheless, by mean of their above-mentioned freedom, contractual parties are allowed to 
insert special terms in their contract by which they determine the legal consequences to be 
applied in case of particular events like force majeure, Brexit or the spread of a certain 
epidemic. Thus, frustration is not available where the contract has otherwise made express 
provision for the consequences of the occurrence of a certain event. In these cases, the 
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74 Cf. Beale: op. cit., 11. 
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question of frustration does not arise in the parties’ relations, but the contract shall be assessed 
by the application of the given clause. 
